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Introduction
ON NOVEMBER 20, 2012, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) arrested Mathew Martoma, a former student of bioethics and
former CR Intrinsic Investors, LLC fund manager, on charges of in-
sider trading.1 The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and
the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) alleged that Martoma violated in-
sider trading laws by engaging in a scheme with neurologist Sidney
Gilman.2 The charges asserted that Gilman provided confidential in-
formation to Martoma about a clinical trial of a drug designed to treat
Alzheimer’s disease. According to the government, this confidential
information allowed Martoma’s firm to trade stocks in pharmaceutical
companies ahead of a public announcement about the results of the
trial that had a negative impact on the value of the shares.3 On Janu-
* Samer B. Korkor is an attorney in Washington D.C. The theories and opinions in
this article are the author’s alone. Thank you to my wife Christine Daya Korkor, brother
Bassel Charles Korkor, and the University of San Francisco Law Review for their comments on
drafts.
1. Bridget Murphy, Insider Trading Suspect Was Model Ethics Student, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Nov. 30, 2012), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/insider-trading-suspect-was-model-ethics-
student.
2. See Complaint ¶¶ 1–4, SEC v. CR Intrinsic Investors, LLC, No. 12-CV-8466 (VM)
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) [hereinafter SEC Complaint]; Complaint ¶¶ 1–3, United States v.
Martoma, No. 12-MAG-2985 (DF) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2012) [hereinafter DOJ Complaint].
3. DOJ Complaint, supra note 2, ¶ 3. At the time of this publication, it is unclear
whether the government will charge Steven Cohen, owner of SAC Capital Advisors, with
any criminal wrongdoing. See Andrew Ross Sorkin & Peter Lattman, New Details Suggest a
Defense in SAC Case, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 3, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/02/03/new-details-suggest-a-defense-in-sac-case/; Sheelah Kolhatkar, Why Hasn’t Ex-
SAC Capital Manager Mathew Martoma Turned on Steve Cohen?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-12-13/why-hasnt-ex-sac-capi-
tal-manager-mathew-martoma-turned-on-steve-cohen (suggesting that Martoma has not co-
operated with the government to provide incriminating information about his former boss,
Steve Cohen, because SAC Capital continues to pay Martoma’s legal fees).
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ary 3, 2013, Martoma pled not guilty.4 The press has reported that
Martoma was a “model ethics student,” and his former attorney used
Martoma’s bioethics background to defend him against the allega-
tions, stating that, “having studied ethics in the biomed area . . .
[Martoma] is keenly aware of what’s right and what’s wrong, and we
do not believe he stepped across the line.”5
This Article explores an unchartered area—the conceptual simi-
larities between concepts in bioethics and the prohibition against in-
sider trading and how these similarities relate to the allegations
against Martoma.6 Part I summarizes Martoma’s background in
bioethics and his relevant professional experience. Part II provides
background regarding the illegality of insider trading and explains
concepts in bioethics that are parallel to the concepts underlying in-
sider trading. The prohibition against insider trading makes it illegal
to trade on material nonpublic information in violation of a duty of
trust.7 There are at least three concepts in bioethics that are relevant
to insider trading: the importance of fiduciary relationships, the main-
tenance of confidentiality of nonpublic information, and the avoid-
ance of conflicts of interest. Bearing these overlapping concepts in
mind, Part III describes the particular allegations the government has
made against Martoma.
Finally, in Part IV, this Article analyzes how overlapping concepts
in bioethics and insider trading relate to the allegations of insider
trading against Martoma. Indeed, while further litigation will deter-
mine what liability, if any, Martoma will face, it is fairly clear that the
concepts in bioethics that Martoma likely studied are relevant to the
government’s insider trading charges against him. Martoma’s back-
ground in bioethics has been used to defend his moral character, but
Martoma’s bioethics background could be a double-edged sword.8
4. Patricia Hurtado & Bob Van Voris, Former SAC Manager Martoma Pleads Not Guilty to
Insider Trading, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-03/
ex-sac-manager-martoma-pleads-not-guilty-to-insider-trading-1-.html.
5. Murphy, supra note 1; Peter Lattman, Martoma, Former SAC Employee, Changes Law-
yers in Insider Case, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 4, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/04/04/former-sac-employee-martoma-changes-lawyers-in-insider-case/.
6. For a discussion on the ethics of insider trading, see generally Gary Lawson, The
Ethics of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 727, 733 (1988) (explaining that “the
ethics of insider trading are merely a particular, and unexceptional, application of wider
moral principles governing marketplace transactions, and one’s ethical views of the prac-
tice are likely to be determined by one’s general perspective on the morality of markets”).
7. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5 to 10b5-2 (2011).
8. The author intentionally does not opine on the strategy of Martoma’s attorney of
discussing Martoma’s bioethics background with the press. It is sufficient to acknowledge
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The government could argue that Martoma’s knowledge of key con-
cepts in bioethics demonstrates his awareness of what it means to be
in violation of a fiduciary duty of trust, the importance of maintaining
confidentiality over nonpublic information, and the reasons to avoid
conflicts of interest.
I. Mathew Martoma’s Background in Bioethics
Martoma studied bioethics at Duke University in the mid-1990s.9
At the time, he was known as Ajai Mathew Thomas.10 Martoma’s pro-
fessor at Duke described Martoma’s undergraduate performance in a
recommendation letter to Stanford’s Business School as “extraordina-
rily intelligent,” “remarkably analytic,” and “wonderfully fair-
minded.”11 The professor appointed Martoma as the chief teaching
assistant for an ethics and policymaking class he taught.12 In addition
to being a teaching assistant, Martoma was apparently interested in
identifying bioethics concerns in literature. According to the profes-
sor’s recommendation, Martoma contributed a great deal to class dis-
cussions of Sissela Bok’s book, Lying, and was highly aware of issues of
moral capacity raised by Camus’ The Plague.13 Martoma graduated
from Duke in December 1995.14
Shortly after graduating from Duke, Martoma was hired by the
National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) to assist in conducting a case
study about ethics and Alzheimer’s disease.15 According to Martoma’s
supervisor at the NIH, Martoma was hired due to his strong training
in bioethics and his congenial personality.16 In 1997, Martoma en-
rolled in Harvard Law School but dropped out before finishing his
first year.17 In July 1998, Martoma authored an article in the Cambridge
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics titled Alzheimer Testing at Silver Years.18
the high likelihood that the information about Martoma’s educational background would
have eventually surfaced and that his attorney would have had to address it.
9. Murphy, supra note 1.
10. Id. Ajai Mathew Thomas legally changed his last name to Martoma in 2001. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Katherine Burton, Saijel Kishan & Bob Van Voris, Cohen’s ‘Elan Guy’ Martoma
Dropped Ethics for Hedge Fund, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-11-23/cohen-s-elan-guy-martoma-dropped-ethics-for-hedge-fund.html.
15. Murphy, supra note 1.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See A. Mathew Thomas et al., Alzheimer Testing at Silver Years, 7 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 294 (1998).
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Martoma eventually enrolled at Stanford University to earn a bus-
iness degree.19 At Stanford, one of his classmates described Martoma
as “really nice, very smart and ethical.”20 In 2003, Martoma married a
pediatrician and took a job as a junior analyst for Sirios Capital Man-
agement LP in Boston, where he worked until 2006. He then joined
the Connecticut-based SAC affiliate, CR Intrinsic Investors LLC, which
was his employer when the alleged insider trading took place.21
Martoma began as an analyst and advanced to the position of hedge
fund portfolio manager with a specialty in the healthcare sector.22
II. The Law of Insider Trading and Parallel Concepts in
Bioethics
Boiled down to its most basic terms, insider trading laws prohibit
(1) trading securities (2) on the basis of (3) material (4) nonpublic
information (5) in violation of a duty of trust or confidence owed di-
rectly or indirectly to the corporation, the corporation’s shareholders,
or the source of the information.23 These five requirements are
nuanced and merit some explanation. (1) “Securities” include a wide
variety of instruments and interests, including but not limited to: com-
mon and preferred stock, treasury stock, notes, bonds, debentures,
certificates of interest, puts, calls, straddles, options or privileges on
any security, and any security-based swap or other derivative instru-
ment.24 (2) A person trades “on the basis of” material nonpublic infor-
mation if the person was aware of the material nonpublic information
at the time the person traded the security.25 (3) Information is “mate-
rial” if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
19. Murphy, supra note 1.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Insider trading laws are derived from section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended (“Exchange Act”). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j to 78j-4 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
Section 10 makes it unlawful to “use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of”
rules promulgated by the SEC. Id. § 78j(b). Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act makes it
unlawful to “engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2011).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (“[A] purchase or sale of a security of an issuer is ‘on
the basis of’ material nonpublic information about that security or issuer if the person
making the purchase or sale was aware of the material nonpublic information when the
person made the purchase or sale.”).
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would consider it important in making an investment decision.26 In
other words, information is material if a reasonable investor would
consider it as having significantly altered the mix of information al-
ready available to the public.27 (4) Information is “nonpublic” if it has
not been disseminated broadly in the marketplace.28 (5) An “insider”
is not expressly defined by the securities laws or the SEC rules, but
courts have referred to an insider as a person or entity that by virtue of
a fiduciary relationship with an issuer of securities has knowledge of,
or access to, material nonpublic information.29 A person with a duty
of trust or confidence is also known as a “fiduciary,”30 and in the se-
curities context, a fiduciary may not exploit his or her advantageous
position by utilizing confidential nonpublic information to secure a
pecuniary gain.31
While one might not expect for there to be overlapping concepts
in securities law and in bioethics, the case against Martoma has
brought these similarities to light. Concepts in bioethics are parallel,
or at least applicable, to insider trading law in at least three ways: (1)
doctors have a fiduciary duty to their patients,32 (2) healthcare profes-
sionals must maintain the confidentiality of their patients’ nonpublic
26. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (providing the test for
“materiality” in the context of § 14(a) cases).
27. Id.; see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (adopting the material-
ity standard for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations as outlined in TSC Indus., 426 U.S.
at 449); United States v. Anderson, 533 F.3d 623, 629–30 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal com-
pany reports found sufficiently material for purposes of section 10(b)).
28. E.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
29. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 S.E.C. 907, 911,
1961 WL 60638 (Nov. 8, 1961).
30. Fiduciary Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/fiduciary (last visited Mar. 18, 2013) (defining fiduciary as both “one that
holds a fiduciary relation or acts in a fiduciary capacity” and “of, relating to, or involving a
confidence or trust: as . . . held or founded in trust or confidence”); see also, e.g., Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) (describing a fiduciary as “a person in whom the sellers [of
the securities] had placed their trust and confidence”).
31. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14 (establishing that underwriters, accountants, law-
yers, or consultants may become fiduciaries of shareholders by entering into confidential
and business relationships with the corporation).
32. Liebergesell v. Evans, 613 P.2d 1170, 1176 (Wash. 1980) (“A fiduciary relationship
arises as a matter of law between . . . a doctor and his patient.”); see also Thigpen v. Locke,
363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962) (explaining that confidential relationships exist in a vari-
ety of situations beyond the attorney-client relationship and stating that the existence of a
fiduciary relationship is determined based on the actualities of the relationship between
the parties involved).
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medical information,33 and (3) healthcare professionals must refrain
from conflicts of interest, especially when a healthcare professional’s
pecuniary self-interest is weighed against the healthcare needs of
patients.34
A. Fiduciary Duties
The concept of a fiduciary duty cuts across securities regulations
and bioethics. In both spheres, fiduciary relationships arise when one
party is justified in expecting loyal conduct from another.35 One often
becomes a fiduciary when he or she possesses specialized information
that creates a knowledge gap between the fiduciary and a third-party
beneficiary who entrusts the fiduciary with private information.36 A
fiduciary may enter into an explicit or implicit agreement that calls
upon the fiduciary to withhold from use or disclosure the information
that creates this information gap.37 Fiduciaries are charged with a duty
of loyalty and must promote the beneficiary’s interest over the fiduci-
ary’s own interest.38 This loyalty provides a check on the potential
abuse of power by the fiduciary, who is often in an advantaged posi-
tion with regard to the beneficiary.39
The Supreme Court has found there to be three theories of in-
sider trading liability, each of which involves a person violating a fidu-
ciary duty of trust or confidence.40 The “classical” theory of insider
trading applies when an insider, in violation of a fiduciary duty to his
33. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82462, 82464 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 160.101) (explaining the need
for a national health privacy framework).
34. For an overview of the issues raised by conflicts of interest in the doctor-patient
relationship, see AM. MED. ASS’N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, REPORT A-I-86
ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 1 (1996) (“When a physician’s commercial interest conflicts so
greatly with the patient’s interest as to be incompatible, the physician should make alterna-
tive arrangements for the care of the patient.”).
35. See Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty
and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 936 (2006).
36. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 141–57 (1986).
37. See Adickes v. Andreoli, 600 S.W.2d 939, 946 (Tex. App. 1980) (“A confidential
relationship may arise not only from the technical fiduciary relationships, but may also
arise informally from moral, social, domestic, or purely personal relationships.”).
38. Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and
Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 244 (1995).
39. Id.; Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (charging fiduciaries with
the duty of “undivided loyalty”).
40. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (establishing the “classical”
theory); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647 (1983) (establishing the “tipper-tippee” theory);
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (establishing the “misappropriation”
theory).
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company, trades the securities of the company on the basis of material
nonpublic information obtained by reason of the insider’s position.41
The “tipper-tippee” theory imposes liability when the tipper “has
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the [ma-
terial nonpublic] information to the tippee,” the tippee “knows or
should know that there has been a breach,” and the tipper incurred
some personal benefit in return.42 The “misappropriation” theory ad-
dresses the situation where a person who is not an insider lawfully
comes into possession of material nonpublic information but never-
theless breaches a duty owed to the source of the information by trad-
ing on the basis of such information or by conveying it to another
person to trade.43 Importantly, in order to fit within any of the three
categories of insider trading, a person must have violated a fiduciary
duty of trust or confidence.
Fiduciary duties of trust, confidence, and loyalty are also preva-
lent in bioethics.44 The nature of the doctor-patient relationship es-
tablishes a special duty for doctors. This is primarily due to the fact
that doctors have expert medical knowledge that patients seek and
rely on. The law imposes on doctors a “trust,” which is a fiduciary re-
sponsibility arising from the dependence and vulnerability of patients
and the disparity between a patient’s and a physician’s knowledge and
ability to act on their expertise.45 The American Medical Association’s
(“AMA”) Code of Ethics recognizes the physician’s fiduciary duty:
“[t]he relationship between patient and physician is based on trust
and gives rise to physicians’ ethical obligations to place patients’ wel-
fare above their own self-interest.”46
The bioethical principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence un-
derlie the fiduciary relationship between patients and doctors.47 The
41. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
42. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660, 662.
43. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
44. See generally Glen O. Gabbard & Carol Nadelson, Professional Boundaries in the Physi-
cian-Patient Relationship, 273 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1445 (1995).
45. See E. Haavi Morreim, Conflicts of Interest: Profits and Problems in Physician Referrals,
262 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 390, 391–92 (1989); AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 8.12
(2006–2007 ed.) [hereinafter AMA CODE]. The Code of Medical Ethics also provides that
“[a] physician shall respect the law and also recognize a responsibility to seek changes in
those requirements which are contrary to the best interests of the patient” and that “[a]
physician shall, while caring for a patient, regard responsibility to the patient as para-
mount.” AMA CODE, supra note 45, at xxvii, lxi.
46. AMA CODE, supra note 45, § 10.015.
47. Albert W. Wu et al., To Tell the Truth: Ethical and Practical Issues in Disclosing Medical
Mistakes to Patients, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 770, 772 (1997); see also Kimberly G. Crone et
al., Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Disclosing Medical Errors, 52 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 1809,
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tenet of “first, do no harm”48 embodies the idea of nonmaleficence as
doctors have an ethical obligation to avoid harming patients.49 The
principle of beneficence recognizes that physicians have an affirma-
tive obligation to assist their patients by doing what is best for them
and admonishes doctors who place their own interests over their pa-
tients’ needs.50
In sum, the bioethical principle of fiduciary obligation relates to
insider trading law because under both domains, one party justifiably
expects loyalty. The fiduciary must not place his or her own interests
over the beneficiary’s interests.
B. Confidentiality
In many ways, a healthcare professional’s or securities trader’s
commitment to maintain the confidence of a patient’s or company’s
sensitive information is an outgrowth of a fiduciary’s duty of trust and
loyalty. Beneficiaries, such as companies and patients, entrust knowl-
edge of themselves to their fiduciaries. This creates an uneven rela-
tionship in that the vulnerability is one-sided.51 The beneficiary
should not fear that his or her nonpublic information or medical con-
ditions will be disclosed to others. There is generally an expectation
that the fiduciary will hold that special knowledge in confidence and
use it exclusively for the benefit of, or on terms established by, the
beneficiary.52
1810–11 (2006); Joan Gibson, Thinking About the “Ethics” in Bioethics, in BIOETHICS: HEALTH
CARE LAW AND ETHICS 4–5 (Barry Furrow et al. eds., 5th ed. 2004).
48. Nonmaleficence Definition, STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1226 (27th ed. 2000)
(“The ethical principle of doing no harm, based on the Hippocratic maxim, primum non
nocere, first do no harm.”).
49. There is a difference between “doing no harm” and “providing benefit.” See ROB-
ERT M. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 22 (1981). This is important because some-
times a physician may consider the preservation of life as an ideal, but the decision of
whether to introduce heroic measures might be different depending upon the
circumstances.
50. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos, Lean on Me: A Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to
Disclose an Emergent Medical Risk to the Patient, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1167, 1184 (2009).
51. See Ian E. Thompson, The Nature of Confidentiality, J. MED. ETHICS 57, 59 (1979).
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959) (stating that a fiduciary “is
under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the benefici-
ary”); Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 750–52 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Drawing on the
Restatement of Trusts and other non-ERISA sources of fiduciary principles, the D.C. Cir-
cuit has ruled that, once an ERISA beneficiary has requested information from an ERISA
fiduciary who is aware of the beneficiary’s status and situation, the fiduciary has an obliga-
tion to convey complete and accurate information material to the beneficiary’s circum-
stance. Eddy, 919 F.2d at 750–52. This is so even if that information comprises elements
about which the beneficiary has not specifically inquired. Id.
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A violation of insider trading laws requires that a person trade on
the basis of information that is material and nonpublic.53 If the infor-
mation is available to the public, there is no “insider” per se as other
individuals have access to the same information that formed the
trader’s decision. In the insider trading context, a trader may obtain
material nonpublic information about his or her own company in sev-
eral ways: by virtue of his or her position, from a “tipper” in breach of
the tipper’s fiduciary duties to a third party of which the tippee is
aware, or even lawfully through the use of a consultant.54 In such cir-
cumstances, the law prevents a securities trader from fraudulently
benefiting from confidential insider information to protect sharehold-
ers who lack the information and to ensure fairness in the industry.55
The concept of confidentiality is not new in bioethics. The 3,000-
year-old Hippocratic Oath enjoins physicians from revealing what they
may “see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of
abroad.”56 Patients expect healthcare professionals and institutions to
maintain the confidentiality of their sensitive personal information. It
fosters a trust relationship as it encourages people to seek medical
care and discuss sensitive issues openly.57 Confidentiality also benefits
public health by encouraging patients to seek treatment for serious
53. Courts have established two theories for determining the point when information
is in the public realm. Under the first theory, information has reached the public realm
when it has been “disclosed in a manner sufficient to insure its availability to the investing
public.” SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). Under
the second theory, information is public when trading has caused the “information to be
fully impounded into the price of the particular stock.” United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d
596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993). The SEC has clung to the first theory, arguing that information
becomes public only by a “public release through the appropriate public media, designed
to achieve a broad dissemination to the investing public generally and without favoring any
special person or group.” In re Faberge, Exchange Act Release No. 10174 [1973] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 79,379 at 83,105 (May 25, 1973); see also SEC v. Davis, Litigation Release
No. 18322 (Sept. 4, 2003) (charging consultant with insider trading for tipping clients of
embargoed information relating to the Treasury’s halt of long bond sales). In 2000, the
SEC provided some limited guidance through Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) by allowing
companies to utilize their websites to distribute information to the public. Regulation FD
states that information on a company’s website will be considered public information
where such a disclosure is “reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distri-
bution of the information to the public.” See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-7881, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (adopting, among
other rules, Regulation FD and Exchange Act Rule 10b5-2).
54. See supra Part II.
55. Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX.
L. REV. 375, 376, 388–93 (1999) (arguing that “insider trading is wrong because it is a
form of fraud”).
56. Hippocrates, The Oath of Hippocrates, in 38 THE HARVARD CLASSICS 2 (1910).
57. Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 50, at 1186–88.
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conditions.58 Of course, there are some challenging exceptions to
maintaining confidentiality in healthcare, such as knowing to whom
to disclose an incapacitated patient’s condition, disclosures that may
ultimately protect a patient, and overriding confidentiality to protect
third parties.59 Nonetheless, these are limited exceptions.60 The pri-
mary principle holds that individuals seeking medical help or advice
entrust sensitive personal information to their doctors. This creates an
uneven relationship that triggers the duty of confidentiality, which is
paramount to the doctor-patient relationship.
Thus, for both healthcare professionals and securities traders, im-
proper use or dissemination of a beneficiary’s confidential informa-
tion must be avoided.
C. Conflicts of Interest
A conflict of interest61 exists when a person entrusted with the
interests of a client, dependent, or the public violates that trust by
promoting his or her own self-interest or a third party’s interest.62
Both healthcare professionals and securities traders who have entered
into fiduciary relationships must make decisions in the best interest of
the beneficiary and avoid conflicts of interest and even the appear-
ance of such a conflict.63 This applies particularly to personal or finan-
58. See id. (explaining that candid disclosure may enhance patients’ trust in physicians
and reassure them that they are receiving adequate care).
59. In the absence of express statutory mandates, some courts have found a common
law duty, founded on reasons of public policy, to disclose patient information when physi-
cians become aware of such information that, if not disclosed, could result in physical
harm or death to members of the public. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551
P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976) (imposing a common law duty on psychotherapists to disclose
threats of harm by their patients to third parties in limited circumstances); TEX. OCC. CODE
ANN. § 159.004(2)(A) (West 2012) (permitting disclosure when physician determines that
there is a probability of imminent physical injury to a third person).
60. Bernard Friedland, Physician-Patient Confidentiality: Time to Re-Examine a Venerable
Concept in Light of Contemporary Society and Advances in Medicine, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 249,
257–59 (1994).
61. A conflict of interest is “a situation in which the self-interest of a person may con-
flict with a fiduciary duty that he owes to another, or in which a person has potentially
conflicting fiduciary duties to two or more persons.” NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER
LAW AND REGULATION § 1.02 (2d ed. 1997).
62. See generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL
RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE 46–48, 303–05 (Bernard Lo & Marilyn J. Field eds.,
2009).
63. CLARK, supra note 36. Clark explains:
[Fiduciaries] may not abuse the beneficiaries in situations in which they have a
conflict of interest. In some contexts, they may act improperly simply by maintain-
ing a state of affairs in which they have a conflict of interest. Most importantly,
this general fiduciary duty of loyalty is a residual concept that can include factual
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cial conflicts that derive from the fiduciary’s role, which might then
influence, or appear to influence, the fiduciary’s judgment when de-
ciding what is in the best interest of the beneficiary.64
Insider trading laws, at their core, are directed at preventing con-
flicts of interest. The laws prohibit insiders from using the nonpublic
information of a fiduciary for personal advantage or to favor third par-
ties.65 This is a conflict of interest because the information would have
been obtained from a fiduciary as a result of a trader’s position at a
company or because the insider enjoys a business relationship with a
company or its agent. Ultimately, the harm caused by engaging in
such conduct injures other shareholders and discourages potential
market participants from making investments due to a lack of trust in
financial markets.66
In healthcare, conflicts of interest may be financial, such as those
resulting from reimbursement incentives, personal investments in
situations that no one has foreseen and categorized. The general duty permits,
and in fact has led to, a continuous evolution in corporate law. At the same time,
the courts and legislatures have developed more specific rules, or particular fidu-
ciary duties, to deal with many recurring situations involving a conflict of interest.
Id. at 141.
64. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., supra note 62, at 52 (acknowledging that
the acceptance of a gift or the prospect of influencing stock in which the fiduciary has an
interest stands to influence the fiduciary’s judgment); Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Tem-
pleton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 708–09 (1st Dist. 1968).
65. See Christopher M. Gorman, Note, Are Chinese Walls the Best Solution to the Problems
of Insider Trading and Conflicts of Interest in Broker-Dealers?, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 475,
477–78 (2004); Mark J. Loewenstein & William K.S. Wang, The Corporation as Insider Trader,
30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 52 (2005) (explaining that if a director or officer owes fiduciary
duties to the corporation and shareholders, then the officer or director will be subject to
multiple conflicting fiduciary duties, and the best interests of the corporation may not
coincide with the best interests of an individual shareholder transacting business with the
corporation).
66. Thomas C. Newkirk, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
& Melissa A. Robertson, Senior Counsel, Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Insider Trading—A U.S. Perspective, Remarks at the 16th International Symposium on
Economic Crime (Sept. 19, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
speecharchive/1998/ spch221.htm).
Some argue that insider trading is a legitimate form of compensation for corpo-
rate employees, permitting lower salaries that, in turn, benefits shareholders. It
provides an incentive to innovation, some argue, by promising huge rewards for
developing a plan or product that will lead to a precipitous rise in the stock (cita-
tion omitted). This argument, however, fails to address the real and significant
hazard of creating an incentive for corporate insiders to enter into risky or ill-
advised ventures for short term personal gain, as well as to put off the public
release of important corporate information so that they can capture the eco-
nomic fruits at the expense of shareholders.
Id.
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medical facilities, or gifts from drug companies.67 In general, conflicts
of interest should be avoided because they may lead to bad outcomes.
Patients and the public may be directly harmed if physicians base
clinical decisions on what is best for them or a third party rather than
on what is best for the patient.68 Patients need to rely on their physi-
cians’ recommendations because physicians have expertise. If patients
fear that physicians are not acting on their behalf, they may worry or
fail to follow recommendations. The public may also be harmed be-
cause if healthcare professionals make decisions based on their own
interests, there is a greater likelihood that they may fail to properly
treat populations and lose public trust.69
It is worth mentioning that in both the healthcare setting and the
insider-trading context, sometimes conflicts may be cured by proper
disclosures.70 Nonetheless, for both doctors and securities traders,
conflicts of interest exist because the fiduciary is entrusted with the
interests of a beneficiary and should not violate that trust by promot-
ing self-interest or the interests of third parties.
III. Allegations Against Martoma
The SEC’s case against Martoma, Gilman, and CR Intrinsic was
outlined in the SEC’s Complaint filed on November 20, 2012 in the
Southern District of New York (“The Complaint”).71 The Complaint
alleged that Martoma’s scheme earned his hedge fund over $276 mil-
67. BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS: A GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS 213 (4th ed.
2009).
68. Id.
69. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL RE-
SEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE 185 (Bernard Lo & Marilyn J. Field eds., 2009) (expres-
sing that conflicts of interest create “unwarranted risks of compromising physician
judgment and undermining public trust—risks that are not outweighed by prospective
benefits for patients or society”).
70. Robert Steinbrook & Bernard Lo, Medical Journals and Conflicts of Interest, 40 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 488, 490 (2012) (explaining that, in the medical context, “[d]isclosure
provides information and can make financial and other relationships widely known. It can
be used as a starting point for asking questions and seeking additional information.
Through news media publicity or apprehension about such publicity, disclosure may lead
to changes that will resolve some conflicts of interest. Disclosure, however, has its limits.
Disclosure does not eliminate bias or resolve a conflict of interest. It does not manage or
end financial ties. Disclosure can also have unintended consequences and perverse ef-
fects”); Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—A Breach In Search of
a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 113 (1998) (explaining that, in the corporate context, “the
ban on insider trading [is] related to the disclosure obligations of issuers, bidders, and
other market participants under the federal securities laws, as a means to enforce those
obligations and accelerate the release of material information”).
71. See SEC Complaint, supra note 2.
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lion in illegal profits or avoided losses in July 2008 by trading based on
material nonpublic information that Martoma learned from Gilman
ahead of a negative public announcement.72 The public announce-
ment was about the clinical trial results for a potential Alzheimer’s
drug being jointly developed by companies in which Martoma’s firm
held a significant amount of securities: Elan Corporation, an Ireland-
based biotechnology company, and Wyeth, a U.S. pharmaceutical
company that was acquired by Pfizer in 2009.73
Before a pharmaceutical company can release a new drug, it must
conduct clinical trials to determine whether the drug is safe and effec-
tive in providing treatment to patients.74 From 2006 to 2008, Elan and
Wyeth jointly conducted a Phase II clinical trial for a potential drug
called bapineuzumab that would have treated Alzheimer’s disease.75
In Phase II, the drug is given to a large group of people (generally,
200–300) to determine if it is effective and to evaluate its safety.76 Dr.
Sidney Gilman, an 80-year-old professor at the University of Michigan
Medical School, served as the chairman of the Safety Monitoring
Committee (“SMC”), which oversaw the clinical trial and met regu-
larly to discuss the health of the trial participants.77 The SMC Operat-
ing Guidelines provided that “strict confidentiality will be maintained
by all the SMC members in accordance with written agreement with
[Elan].”78 Gilman’s contract with Elan provided that “[a]ny and all
information which Elan may disclose to Consultant under this Agree-
ment will be considered confidential.”79
According to the Complaint, Martoma met with Gilman through
paid consultations, arranged by a New York-based expert network
firm,80 that took place between 2006 and 2008.81 During this two-year
72. Id. ¶ 1.
73. Id. psign; ¶ 1, 14–15.
74. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2006); Regulatory Informa-
tion: Legislation, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/
Legislation/default.htm (last visited July 21, 2012) (“The Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act of 1938 completely overhauled the public health system. . . . authori[zing] the
FDA to demand evidence of safety for new drugs.”).
75. SEC Complaint, supra note 2, ¶ 19.
76. Id. ¶ 18.
77. Id. ¶¶ 2, 22; Kolhatkar, supra note 3.
78. SEC Complaint, supra note 2, ¶ 23.
79. Id.
80. “Expert network” refers to a firm that connects clients, principally institutional
investors such has hedge funds, with individuals who have special expertise in the client’s
area of interest. See Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider Trading: Legal
Theories, Common Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring Compliance, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 151,
177 (2011).
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period, Gilman earned nearly $108,000 from fifty-nine consultations
with portfolio managers and analysts at CR Intrinsic and an affiliated
investment advisor, forty-two of which were consultations with
Martoma.82 The Complaint states that Gilman developed a personal
relationship with Martoma such that Gilman eventually came to view
Martoma as a friend and pupil.83 Starting at the latest in 2007, Gilman
would call Martoma after SMC meetings to inform him of what he
learned during the meetings. Gilman’s expert network consultations
with Martoma were allegedly coordinated around scheduled SMC
meetings. The Complaint further alleges that the consults frequently
occurred on the same day or shortly after Gilman had attended an
SMC meeting.84
Throughout 2007 and up to July 2008, CR Intrinsic and an affili-
ated investment advisor established long positions in Elan and Wyeth
securities.85 As of June 30, 2008, their portfolios owned over $328 mil-
lion worth of Elan securities and $373 million of Wyeth stock despite
advice from two CR Intrinsic analysts against holding these
positions.86
On June 17, 2008, Elan and Wyeth released top-line results of the
Phase II trial.87 The market reacted positively to the announcement,
and the stock prices of Elan and Wyeth rose more than ten percent
and four percent, respectively.88 However, the Complaint alleges that
investors were looking ahead to the expected release of final, detailed
results on July 29, 2008.89
In late June 2008, Gilman learned that Elan and Wyeth had se-
lected him to offer the public announcement of the trial results at a
medical conference on July 29, 2008.90 Allegedly, after finding out
about his selection, Gilman sent an email to Martoma with the subject
81. SEC Complaint, supra note 2, ¶ 3.
82. Id. ¶ 25.
83. Id.
84. Id. ¶ 27.
85. Id. ¶¶ 31, 33. A long position is “[t]he buying of a security such as a stock, com-
modity or currency, with the expectation that the asset will rise in value.” Definition of Long
Position, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/long.asp (last visited Apr.
11, 2013). A short position is “[t]he sale of a borrowed security, commodity or currency
with the expectation that the asset will fall in value.” Definition of Short Position, INVES-
TOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/short.asp (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
86. SEC Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 31, 33.
87. Id. ¶ 20.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. ¶ 36.
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line “Some news” and requested that Martoma set up a conversation
through the expert network firm.91 The Complaint alleges that in the
weeks leading up to the July 29 announcement, Gilman had several
telephone calls with Martoma during which he provided material non-
public information regarding the safety and efficacy results for the
Phase II trial.92
On July 17, 2008, Gilman allegedly provided Martoma with ac-
tual, detailed results of the clinical trial, in advance of the July 29 an-
nouncement.93 Specifically, Gilman received a PowerPoint from Elan
in an email labeled “Confidential, Do Not Distribute” that summa-
rized the detailed efficacy and safety results for the Phase II Trial.94
The same day, Gilman and Martoma exchanged phone calls during
which Gilman allegedly provided Martoma with information con-
tained in the PowerPoint, which Gilman also sent to Martoma.95 Ac-
cording to the Complaint, Gilman and Martoma continued to
communicate after their July 17 conversation in the days leading up to
the July 29 announcement.96
According to the Complaint, three days after receiving the
PowerPoint presentation, Martoma spoke with the owner and head
trader at SAC Capital, Steve Cohen,97 and informed Cohen that he
was no longer “comfortable” with the investments in Elan.98 Shortly
thereafter, the hedge fund portfolios managed by CR Intrinsic and
the affiliated investment advisor liquidated their combined long posi-
tions in Elan and Wyeth, worth over $700 million, and took substantial
short positions (betting against the stock), eventually selling over $960
million in Elan and Wyeth securities in just over a week.99 Allegedly,
91. Id.
92. SEC Complaint, supra note 2, ¶ 37.
93. Id. ¶ 3.
94. Id. ¶¶ 40–42.
95. Id.
96. Id. ¶ 43.
97. The Complaint states that the individual with whom Martoma spoke was “Portfo-
lio Manager A,” who the Complaint identifies as the “owner and founder” of CR Intrinsic.
Id. ¶ 17. Steven Cohen is the founder and owner of CR Intrinsic. Linette Lopez, Hedge Fund
Billionaire Steve Cohen Is “Portfolio Manager A” in the Latest Insider Trading Case (Nov. 20,
2012), http:// www.businessinsider.com/steve-cohen-cr-intrinsic-2012-11.
98. SEC Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 42, 44. But see Sorkin & Lattman, supra note 3
(“Internal SAC trading records, according to people directly involved in the case, indicate
that the hedge fund did not have a negative bet in place in advance of the announcement
of the drug trial’s disappointing results. Instead, the records indicated that SAC, through a
series of trades, including a complex transaction known as an equity swap, had virtually no
exposure—neither long nor short—heading into the disclosure of the drug data.”).
99. SEC Complaint, supra note 2, ¶ 4.
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this re-positioning allowed the hedge funds to collectively reap profits
and avoid losses of over $276 million.
On July 29, 2008, after the close of U.S. securities markets,
Gilman presented the results of the Phase II Trial at the medical con-
ference, and Elan and Wyeth issued a press release summarizing the
results.100 The July 29, 2008 announcement failed to meet the mar-
ket’s expectations.101 The next day, Elan’s share price fell nearly forty-
two percent and Wyeth’s share price fell nearly twelve percent.102 At
the end of the year, Martoma received a $9.3 million bonus, a signifi-
cant portion of which was attributed to the profits that the Elan and
Wyeth trades generated.103
IV. Analysis
On their face, the factual allegations, if true, in the SEC’s case
against Martoma and Gilman appear to be strong.104 The factual alle-
gations maintain that Gilman provided Martoma with the actual, de-
tailed results of the clinical trial, both by phone and email, and that
Martoma caused the liquidation of hundreds of millions of dollars in
stock just before the negative public announcement about the clinical
trial. However, insider trading cases often hinge on an intricate and
nuanced understanding of the facts, and, aside from oral testimony,
the government and Martoma’s attorneys have at least four million
documents to review and digest.105
The question for the purposes of this Article, however, is whether
Martoma, who was a “model ethics student,” was particularly capable
of understanding “what’s right and what’s wrong” in the insider trad-
ing context as a result of his bioethics studies, as his former attorney
suggested.106 Such an assertion advances a theory that Martoma’s
bioethics background in fact prevented him from engaging in wrong-
doing.107 An analysis of the conduct at issue, however, reveals that in-
100. Id. ¶ 52.
101. Id. ¶ 21.
102. Id. ¶ 53.
103. Id. ¶¶ 6, 56.
104. But see Sorkin & Lattman, supra note 3.
105. Patricia Hurtado, Martoma Judge Grants Defense Time to Review U.S. Evidence (Mar. 5,
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-05/martoma-judge-grants-defense-time-
to-review-u-s-evidence.html.
106. See Murphy, supra note 1.
107. See Murphy, supra note 1. The author does not comment on the strategic decision
or likely impact of introducing evidence regarding Martoma’s background in bioethics at
trial. It is sufficient to acknowledge that it is possible under FED. R. CIV. P. 404(a)(2).
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voking Martoma’s background in bioethics may be a double-edged
sword.
In order for Martoma to have identified the various issues from
his bioethics studies that apply, he would likely have had to consider
both his and Gilman’s situations. The government likely has two
prosecutorial theories in mind. First, under the “tipper-tippee theory,”
Gilman breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders of Elan by dis-
closing material nonpublic information about the clinical trial to
Martoma, who knew or should have known about Gilman’s breach.
Second, under the “misappropriation theory,” Martoma lawfully came
into possession of material nonpublic information but breached a
duty owed to Gilman or Elan by trading on the basis of such
information.
Both of these theories require that Martoma knew or should have
known that he or Gilman were in breach of a fiduciary duty.108
Martoma’s studies in bioethics likely addressed the special nature of a
fiduciary relationship whereby a person or entity justifiably expects
loyalty from a fiduciary, implying that the fiduciary will not place his
or her own interests ahead of the beneficiary’s interest. Gilman was
the chairman of the SMC, which oversaw the clinical trial and met
regularly to discuss the health of the trial participants.109 This could
provide a basis for the government to argue that Martoma’s knowl-
edge of Gilman’s status may have caused Martoma to believe that
Gilman was a fiduciary of Elan. Likewise, the government could argue
that if Martoma lawfully came into possession of material nonpublic
information about the likelihood of the Alzheimer’s drug’s success, he
might have concluded that he, too, became a fiduciary.
Further, the government may argue that Gilman’s status as the
chairman of the SMC may have triggered other aspects of Martoma’s
bioethics studies that also relate to insider trading regulations. For ex-
ample, the importance of confidentiality that fiduciaries must main-
tain when they are entrusted with sensitive knowledge is relevant in
both healthcare and securities settings.110 An important fact in this
matter will be whether the information that Martoma received from
Gilman was indeed both nonpublic and material. Gilman allegedly
sent Martoma a nonpublic PowerPoint presentation from Elan that
summarized the detailed efficacy and safety results for the Phase II
108. See supra text accompanying notes 42–43.
109. SEC Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 2, 22.
110. See supra Part II.B.
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trial.111 Part of Martoma’s defense strategy will likely be to analyze
whether this information was actually nonpublic and whether it was in
fact material in the insider trading context—meaning that a reasona-
ble investor would consider it important in making an investment
decision.112
Additionally, in both healthcare and corporate settings, conflicts
of interest should be avoided by fiduciaries who are entrusted with the
interests of a third party.113 A fiduciary violates that trust by promoting
self-interest or the interests of third parties. Just as a fiduciary-health-
care professional must prioritize a patient’s interest in medical deci-
sion-making and avoid considerations that benefit the healthcare
professional’s pecuniary interest, the insider trading laws disallow a
fiduciary who has material nonpublic information from trading securi-
ties to benefit himself or a third party.114
The dust has certainly not settled on this case.115 SAC Capital and
CR Intrinsic recently settled the SEC’s case against the corporate enti-
ties for a record $602 million.116 While further litigation will deter-
mine what liability, if any, Martoma will face, it is fairly clear that the
concepts in bioethics that Martoma likely studied are relevant and ap-
plicable to the government’s insider trading charges against him.
It is notable that Gilman was retained through an expert network
firm. Such firms are intended to connect clients, principally institu-
tional investors such has hedge funds, with individuals who have spe-
cial knowledge in the client’s area of interest. The concept behind
expert networks is to protect investor resources and to eliminate un-
111. SEC Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 40–42.
112. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
113. See supra Part II.C.
114. See supra Part II.C.
115. Another aspect of the case that will require further investigation and understand-
ing is the timing of Martoma and Gilman’s discussions. The discussions allegedly occurred
almost immediately after Gilman learned of the trial results, allegedly leading Martoma to
cause the selling of securities—right before the negative public announcement. See SEC
Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 40–43.
116. Bob Van Voris, SAC’s Record $602 Million Settlement Approved, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS-
WEEK (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-04-16/sac-s-record-602-
million-sec-settlement-approved (noting that the settlement remains subject to a future
court of appeals decision on whether defendants in SEC cases may be allowed to neither
admit nor deny fault in such agreements). Wyeth Investors also recently filed suit against
SAC Capital, CR Intrinsic, and SAC founder Steven Cohen seeking damages based on the
alleged insider trading. Bob Van Voris, SAC Capital Sues by Wyeth Investors in Tiping Claim,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK. (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-04-
12/sac-capital-sued-by-wyeth-investors-in-tiping-claim.
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certainty.117 When used appropriately, expert networks add value to
clients by connecting them with experts who have specialized experi-
ence and knowledge.118 However, according to the Complaint,
Gilman was more than an expert who discussed his knowledge of the
pharmaceutical industry. Gilman viewed Martoma as a “friend and pu-
pil.”119 Multiple precautions can and should be taken to ensure that
communications between investors and experts do not violate insider
trading laws or fiduciary obligations, confidentiality, and conflicts of
interest. These precautions include, but are not limited to: screening
experts, monitoring interactions between the investors and experts,
documenting such interactions, and developing a compliance pro-
gram to deal with insider trading questions and possible government
inquiries.120 It is unclear whether such precautions were taken in this
instance. Did Gilman and Martoma’s relationship cross the line?
When Martoma and Gilman spoke to each other, was a representative
of the expert network on each call? This and other facts will be the
important details that further investigation will unveil.
While these questions remain unanswered, it is clear (although
perhaps unexpected) that the principles of conduct relevant to the
field of bioethics intersect with how a fiduciary must deal with mate-
rial nonpublic information. Whether Martoma’s background in
bioethics ultimately impacts this case also remains to be seen.
Conclusion
Conceptual similarities exist between bioethics and insider trad-
ing laws. Just as the prohibition against insider trading makes it illegal
to trade on material nonpublic information in violation of a duty of
trust, concepts in bioethics impose a fiduciary duty on doctors, who
should maintain the confidentiality of nonpublic medical information
and refrain from conflicts where their pecuniary interest supersedes
the needs of patients. At the time of this Article’s publication it is un-
clear what liability, if any, Martoma will face. It is clear, however, that
Martoma’s background in bioethics and securities trading would have
familiarized him with the importance of fiduciary relationships, main-
taining confidentiality over sensitive information, and avoiding con-
flicts of interest.
117. Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 80.
118. Id.
119. SEC Complaint, supra note 2, ¶ 25.
120. Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 80.
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